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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES:
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

JOSÉ A. CABRANES*
The question today is not whether the federal system of Guidelines
Sentencing is better or worse than the system of unguided discretion that it
replaced. There is well-nigh universal agreement that the general outlines of
the current system are here to stay. All of us have acknowledged that Congress
is not likely in the near future to repeal those portions of the Sentencing
Reform Act that mandated the creation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
The Guidelines have become deeply entrenched. More than half of active
federal judges have been appointed since the Guidelines became effective in
November of 1987. Few federal probation officers, and fewer Assistant United
States Attorneys, have labored under any other regime of federal sentencing.
Moreover, completely abolishing the Sentencing Guidelines would involve
repealing not only most of the Sentencing Reform Act, but numerous other
statutory provisions; over twenty criminal statutes enacted in the last decade
explicitly refer to the Sentencing Guidelines, generally by instructing the
Commission to provide a sentence “enhancement” for certain offenders.
In light of the entrenchment of the Guidelines, we should have no illusion
that they will be easily discarded or supplanted in the near future. The
question, therefore, is whether the present system should be modified or
reformed to achieve greater coherence, consistency, accountability, and,
ultimately, a higher level of justice. At stake here is the very legitimacy of our
system of criminal justice.
I propose three reforms that could be undertaken without amendment of
the Sentencing Reform Act or other congressional action—that is, by exercise
of the authority of the Sentencing Commission or of the Advisory Committee
on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. These three reforms would, I
believe, at least ameliorate certain of the Guidelines’ most troubling
shortcomings. I hope that these proposals will be entertained by a range of
policy-makers with widely divergent views of the Guidelines as a whole.
* United States Circuit Judge for the Second Circuit (1994-); United States District Judge for the
District of Connecticut (1979-1994; Chief Judge, 1992-1994); Author, with Kate Stith, of FEAR
OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1998), from which he draws
here. This is a lightly revised version of concluding remarks delivered at the Conference on
Sentencing Guidelines.
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Apart from a general plea for simplification of the structure and text of the
Guidelines, I have only one recommendation relating to the substance of the
Guidelines; the two others basically accept the substance and try to make the
procedures fairer, more coherent, and more workable.
I.

TREAT SOME “REAL OFFENSE” FACTORS AS BASES FOR “GUIDED”
DEPARTURES

My substantive recommendation is that the Commission should treat some
“real offense” factors not as bases for mandatory adjustment of the sentencing
range, but as bases for “guided departures”—that is, departures guided by the
Commission’s advice.
Reducing reliance on precise and complex mandatory sentencing
instructions, and making greater use of guided departures instead, would
fortify the moral dimension of sentencing, would reduce the robotics of
judging under the Guidelines, would increase the comprehensibility of the
Guidelines—thereby enhancing their legitimacy in the eyes of the public—and
would respond to due process concerns, about which more anon.
Much of the complexity and seeming arbitrariness of the present
Guidelines is a result of the attempt to specify the exact degree of each
sentencing factor that warrants an additional one-point adjustment in Offense
Level or criminal history score. What I suggest instead is that the Commission
identify each factor warranting an adjustment and then allow the sentencing
judge a range within which he or she would determine the appropriate value of
the adjustment in the case at hand. The Commission could make the range
large or small.
Making greater use of guided departures may be especially appropriate
with respect to “real offense” (that is, non-statutory) factors that, as the
Guidelines are currently written, always greatly affect the defendant’s final
sentencing range—in particular, “special offense characteristics” involving
only quantity of harm, the principle of “relevant conduct,” and the weight
accorded to criminal history.
These are the areas where the lack of countervailing judicial authority is
most troubling, both in terms of checks and balances on prosecutorial power
and in terms of due process for the defendant. More generally, the
Commission might provide guidance to judges, encouraging departures within
some range where the judge is able to demonstrate that a particular adjustment
required by the Guidelines is either too large or too small in relation to
individual culpability. Of course, all departures (“guided” by the Commission
or otherwise) would have to be explained by the sentencing judge and would
continue to be reviewed by the appellate courts under the statutory standard of
“reasonable[ness].”
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II. ENHANCE THE PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS AT SENTENCING
As for procedural aspects of the Guidelines, I propose that the Judicial
Conference of the United States, the administrative governing board of the
federal courts, reassess the procedural protections that are available, or should
be available, at sentencing.
This assessment could be carried out by the Advisory Committee on the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or perhaps by a committee appointed for
this purpose. Whatever committee undertakes this study should reexamine
both the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Guideline Manual’s
Chapter Six policy statements on sentencing procedures. As matters now
stand, some of the rules governing sentencing hearings are spelled out in the
Guidelines Manual, while others are stated in the Criminal Rules.
To its credit, the Sentencing Commission devoted substantial attention to
the procedural aspects of sentencing even before these issues were taken up in
the Federal Rules. The “Policy Statements” in Chapter Six recognize that factfinding under a mandatory sentencing regime is of critical importance. They
instruct judges to permit both parties “an adequate opportunity” to dispute any
factors relevant to sentencing under the Guidelines, and they encourage
“reliable” fact-finding (albeit under a “preponderance” standard).
In 1993, moreover, the Commission added to its “Commentary” on plea
agreements a paragraph that “encourages” prosecutors to disclose to the
defendant prior to any plea of guilty those “facts and circumstances . . . that are
relevant to the application” of the Guidelines. This 1993 amendment
implicitly acknowledges the unfairness of having a defendant plead guilty
before he is advised of the punishment that the mandatory system of
sentencing has in store for him.
Until now, however, the Commission has not been prepared to go very far
in prescribing adjudicatory procedures at sentencing, despite its recognition of
the fully adjudicatory nature of the Guidelines sentencing process. Moreover,
the Commission’s Policy Statements have not set forth a realistic or workable
approach to fact-finding by probation officers and to plea agreements. The
dominant concern of the Sentencing Commission in Chapter Six of the
Guidelines Manual has been to discourage evasion of the Guidelines by the
parties and the judge.
That, of course, is a perfectly reasonable concern of the Commission. But
it is by no means clear that the Sentencing Commission is the most appropriate
place to address issues of sentencing procedure. To be sure, the Commission is
authorized by the Sentencing Reform Act to promulgate “Policy Statements”
on procedures for implementation of the Sentencing Guidelines. Some caselaw, however, suggests that these policies may not actually be binding on
federal judges in the way that formal Guidelines are. In any event, I have
never heard anyone argue that Sentencing Commission “Policy Statements”
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should or would prevail over conflicting provisions adopted in the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Let me suggest that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are the most
appropriate forum (indeed, the obvious forum) in which to address matters of
sentencing procedure. The process provided in the Rules Enabling Act is far
more open and thorough than the process provided in the Sentencing Reform
Act. The Sentencing Commission issues a variety of proposed Guidelines
amendments for public comment (and sometimes holds public hearings), then
issues those it desires as final amendments. Thereafter, it awaits the 180-day
period during which Congress may review the amendments. There have been
few congressional hearings on the Commission’s proposals, and only once has
Congress rejected an amendment proposed by the Commission. Moreover,
under the terms of the Sentencing Reform Act, the Commission need not even
abide by these procedural requirements in issuing Policy Statements, since the
statutory requirements of public notice and of congressional review apply only
to formal “Guidelines.”
The process by which amendments are made to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure is far more exhaustive, and that process is more likely to
be responsive to a variety of perspectives and concerns. I will not go into the
specifics of the Rules Enabling process here, except to note that it is multistep; nothing happens unless it is approved by several different groups. And
here too, Congress always has the final opportunity to review and revise.
For the most part, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were written in
the pre-Guidelines era. With the notable exception of Rule 32, pertaining to
the sentencing hearing itself, these Rules barely acknowledge the existence of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The Sentencing Commission, not the
Judicial Conference, has played the leading role with respect to sentencing
practice and procedure in the age of the Guidelines. This is so despite the fact
that, for the last fifty years, the Judicial Conference has insisted that the Rules
Enabling process is the best way to address evidentiary and procedural issues
in both civil and criminal litigation.
As I have noted, the sentencing hearing itself is governed by a combination
of Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Policy
Statements in Chapter Six of the Sentencing Manual. Pursuant to these
requirements, the procedural protections afforded to a defendant at a
sentencing hearing are not nearly as substantial as those available in other
adjudicatory settings. Most importantly, the rules of evidence do not apply, the
standard of proof is “preponderance of the evidence,” and there is no right to
confrontation of adverse witnesses.
Some individual judges and other commentators—including, perhaps most
notably, Chief Judge Edward Becker of the Third Circuit—have urged the
implementation of greater procedural safeguards at the sentencing hearing.
One proposal is that the standard of proof applied by the judge at sentencing
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hearings under the Guidelines be raised from the low “preponderance”
standard to a heightened standard such as “clear and convincing evidence,”
perhaps even to the standard at criminal trials of “proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Another proposal is that certain of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
especially those relating to hearsay, be made applicable to sentencing hearings.
Others have proposed that the Federal Rule governing plea hearings, Rule
11, be amended to require the Government to file a notice of sentencing facts
prior to the entry of a plea of guilty. As Rule 11 is now written, it does not
attempt to prescribe the information that has to be given to a defendant about
the mandatory consequences flowing from the Guidelines. (Indeed, district
judges often—and understandably—tell defendants at a change of plea hearing
that no one, at that point, knows with any certainty or confidence where the
projected sentencing calculus will lead.) It is not until after a defendant pleads
guilty that he must be advised of the allegations against him regarding relevant
conduct and other “real offense” factors that may dramatically increase the
sentencing range prescribed by the Guidelines. Requiring notice of sentencing
facts prior to the defendant’s plea of guilty would simply make mandatory
what the Sentencing Commission has already “encouraged” in its 1993
amendment to the Guidelines.
The simple fact underlying all of these procedural proposals is this: the
sentencing hearing has been transformed by the Guidelines into an
adjudicatory proceeding, with fact-finding and application of law to the
findings. Yet the procedural rules are vestiges of the previous era of broad
judicial discretion, and thus remain distinctly non-adjudicatory.
This
inconsistency provides an incentive for prosecutors, in the words of a
distinguished former Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
to “indict for less serious offenses which are easy to prove and then expand
them in the probation office.” Prosecutors acting in good faith are tempted to
take advantage of a lawful means of bypassing the requirements of indictment
and trial found in the Constitution and in the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure and to seek punishment of a defendant under the less stringent
adjudicatory requirements of a sentencing hearing.
III. ALLOW JUDGES TO ACCEPT SENTENCES AGREED UPON BY THE
PARTIES
My third and final proposal is a straightforward one: that judges should be
given greater leeway in accepting plea bargains. Specifically, I propose that
the Sentencing Guidelines and/or the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure be
amended to recognize explicitly the authority of the sentencing judge to
impose a sentence in accordance with a plea agreement where the judge finds
that the proposed sentence would achieve the purposes of criminal punishment
at least as well as the sentence suggested by the Guidelines.
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As has been noted by more than one observer of the federal sentencing
system, the Guidelines have not acknowledged the extent to which the formal
demands of law are inevitably tempered in implementation. Until now, the
Guidelines have ignored, or attempted to suppress, the adversarial bargaining
that is virtually inherent in litigation. Until now, the Guidelines have driven
the process of adjustment underground and hidden from observers the
decisions that actually shape a sentence.
Most criminal cases in the federal courts, as in other courts of this country,
end in explicit or implicit plea bargains—just as most civil cases are resolved
by settlement. Although over ninety percent of federal convictions are
obtained by pleas of guilty, rather than by trial, the Guidelines do not clearly
acknowledge the legitimacy of settlements based on the parties’ agreement on
offense conduct and, in turn, a below-Guidelines sentencing range. The result
is that prosecutors and defense attorneys, though “officers of the court,” are
sorely tempted to deny information to both the probation officer and the court
that would fully reveal all arguably relevant aspects of the case.
The current Guidelines also place judges in an ethically uncertain position.
When an apparently Guidelines-evading plea agreement is brought to a judge,
he or she has two options. The judge might, on the one hand, accept the pleaagreement and claim (“for the record”) to be applying the Sentencing
Guidelines—even though the judge, the prosecutor, the defense attorney, and
the probation officer all know that, in fact, the judge is approving an agreement
of the parties that has the effect of avoiding an otherwise-applicable Guidelines
range. Alternatively, the judge may ignore the agreement of the parties and
impose the sentence called for by the Guidelines—not an attractive option
when no one in the courtroom (including, quite possibly, the probation officer)
believes that the presumptive Guidelines sentence is appropriate in the case at
hand.
Neither of these options is particularly attractive to a judge who is
committed to the rule of law. The Sentencing Commission’s effort to vest
probation officers with autonomy from judges, and to direct their activities and
responsibilities, has also led to tension and confusion among all the
participants in sentencing.
Much, though not all, of the dissimulation, distrust and discomfort
generated by the Guidelines could be avoided if judges understood that they
are authorized to accept a plea agreement that resolved matters differently from
the resolution that would be mandated under the Sentencing Guidelines in the
absence of the agreement.1 Recognition of the legitimacy of such plea

1. This clarification would require no congressional action. The duties of the Sentencing
Commission already include promulgation of general policy statements regarding the appropriate
use of “the authority granted under rule 11(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to
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agreements would also clarify the role of the probation officer. Where adverse
parties have arrived at an agreement (or partial agreement) that both they and
the judge believe is appropriate and achieves the objectives of punishment
specified by Congress (including, most importantly, those specified in the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984), we should defer to the judgment of the
decision-makers who know the most about the case, rather than to the vagaries
of sentencing rules constructed by persons who (by definition) know nothing
about the case.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Sentencing Reform Act worked a revolution in federal sentencing.
Since, by all appearances, this revolution is here to stay, it is time we moved
from general opposition or defense of the Guidelines to more modest proposals
for reform. The three proposals I have made herein accept the Guidelines as a
fact of life. If implemented, however, these proposals would make sentencing
under the Guidelines a fairer and more sensible process.

accept or reject a plea agreement entered into pursuant to rule 11(e)(1).”
994(a)(2)(E).

28 U.S.C. §
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